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A post-Independence Scottish 
immigration system: how it might be 
shaped by European Union 
requirements * 
 
Professor Robert E. Wright, University of Strathclyde 
 
Abstract: This paper examines how the SNP Government¶s ³double desire´ of independence and 
European Union membership would impact on its ability to design and deliver an effective immigration 
policy. Most EU legislation is concerned with refugees and asylum seekers and says little about how 
economic immigrants and family reunification immigrants are selected. As such, the main conclusion is 
that EU legislation will not impact unduly on an immigration system designed by a post-Independence 
Scotland. However, the expectation is that Scotland would be obliged to join the Schengen Area - and 
leave the current Common Travel Area. This view is contrary to that of the Scottish Government whose 
current stated preference is that an independent Scotland should remain in the Common Travel Area, with 
the Rest of UK (RUK) and the Republic of Ireland. The positive benefits of Scotland joining the Schengen 
Area have not been, as yet, fully explored by either the Scottish or UK Government. 
 
* I am grateful to Dr. Mariarosalba Angrisani, University of Naples, Federico II, for her research assistance. 




Scotland¶s independence referendum will take place on 18 September 2014. If the majority of the 
population aged 16 and older vote ³yes´ it is accepted by the Scottish and UK Governments that this 
would be a mandate for Scotland to leave the UK and become a ³new´ European Union (EU) member 
state. If Scotland does achieve independence it will need to construct institutions that it currently does not 
have. This goes well beyond deciding what currency to use. or how to pay out pensions and welfare 
benefits,  or  what  tuition  fees  should  be  charged  to  English  students  wishing  to  study  at  Scottish 
universities.  The  focus  of  this  paper  is  how  an  independent  Scotland  will  deal  with  immigration. 
Immigration is currently a ³Ueserved poweU´ which means that immigration policy is decided by the UK 
Government and the immigration system is managed by the Home Office UK Border Agency. Currently, 
the Scottish Government plays no significant role in immigration matters. Therefore, an independent 
Scotland would need to put in place an immigration system and formulate an immigration policy that 
focuses on Scotland-specific needs and interests. 
 
To a certain extent, Scotland ³taking control´ of immigration may well be welcomed by a majority of Scots 
and for a variety of reasons. One reason may be that it will allow Scotland to significantly reduce if not 
³stop´ immigration and in a sense pursue a policy in line with what the Prime Minister David Cameron 
wants for the UK as a whole. Another view is that it would allow Scotland to use immigration strategically 
as a source of lower-cost labour to help provide services for the domestic population, without having to 
grant residence and pay welfare benefits.     What would happen in reality will almost certainly be 
somewhere between these two views, with immigration policy being geared to both economic and 
humanitarian considerations. 
 
What is clear is that Scotland will not be able to do entirely what it wishes with respect to immigration if it is 
serious about being a member state of the EU. The EU has clear expectations on what is required of ³new´
member states with to respect immigration. These rules and regulations are embodied in the so-called 
Lisbon Treaty. This legislation is enforced by Directives and Regulations, which are the most important 
forms of binding EU Law issued by the European Union Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 
The author does not wish to enter into the debate about whether Scotland will be able to make a smooth 
transition - or will have to re-apply - to be the 29th EU member state.  However, the working assumption 
used here is that either outcome will require an independent Scotland to ³Woe the line´ with respect to 
current EU legislation. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 argues that an independent Scotland could (quite easily) 
build  an  effective  immigration  system  based  around  five  general  classes  of  immigrants.  Section  3 
considers how such an immigration system would be shaped by EU legislation, while Section 4 considers 
the implications of the Schengen Agreement. Conclusions follow in Section 5. 





2. Immigrant Classes 
 
There  is  a  large  body  of  research  in  the  field  of  population  economics  concerned  with  designing 
immigration systems aimed at meeting specific economic and social criteria (see Constant and 
Zimmermann, 2013). In addition, detailed data has been collected relating to the effectiveness of 
immigration systems in a variety of countries. This includes countries with ³points-based´ selection 
mechanisms that emphasise employability (e.g. Australia, Canada and the UK) as well as countries with 
selection mechanisms based on other criteria like family reunification (e.g. the United States). It is the 
author¶s view that it would not be a difficult task to design and implement an immigration system in an 
independent Scotland that is based on Scottish economic and labour market considerations. 
 
In order to focus this discussion, assume that Scotland becomes an independent country outside the 
European Union. If this was the case, then Scotland could put in place an immigration system that builds 
on the good practices developed in countries that ³manage´ their immigration. In addition, Scotland would 
not be required to following the good - or bad -practices prescribed by a dominant and larger political 
entity, be that the UK or EU. 
 
Such a system might be based around five general immigrant types or classes. The first class is Economic 
Migrants, who migrate almost exclusively for reasons of employment and earnings. Within this class, there 
are three sub-classes: the (1) ³high-skilled´ (2) ³low-skilled´ and (3) ³entrepreneurs´ $ points-based 
immigration system, not dissimilar to that currently in place in the UK, could be used to ³selecW´ low-skilled 
and high-skilled immigrants (see Mosca and Wright, 2009). With respect to entrepreneurs, a set of relevant 
thresholds could be set: the amount of money to be invested in the Scottish economy and/or the number of 
jobs to be created in new enterprises. 
 
The second class of immigrants is Refugees and Asylum-seekers. With only three international airports, 
and sea ports far from the main refugee source countries, it seems unlikely that Scotland would attract a 
large number of individuals applying (directly) for asylum at its ports of entry. However, as a good global 
citizen Scotland would likely wish to be a party to the United Nation¶s 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol 
on Refugees (see United Nations, 2011). This would require that Scotland grant asylum to a given number 
of refugees on an annual basis.  Given the experience of other countries that are party to the Convention 
and  respond  to the global  refugee  challenge,  it is  estimated  that  this  would translate  into Scotland 
accepting about 400 people per annum. This is a very small number of immigrants when compared to 
Scotland¶s population of 5.3 million and net-migration that over the past few years has averaged between 
20,000 to 25, 000 per annum. 
 
The third class is Family Reunification Immigrants. An example would be a non-Scottish citizen who 
marries a Scottish citizen. A key question here is what otheU³Uelatives´ - if any - would be treated as family 
reunification immigrants: mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, cousins etc.?  In addition, a points-based 
system could be configured to allow the allocation of points for having a relative or relatives who are 
citizens living in Scotland (as is done in Australia and Canada). Deciding how far down the family tree 
family reunification would ³counW´in terms of points, however, can be a tricky issue. 
 
The fourth class of immigrants is Students. Most would be studying at higher education institutions. 
Whether it is appropriate to refer to international students as ³immigrants´ per se is debatable. Scotland 
has a large higher education sector compared to England and many other high-income countries and it is, 
in effect, an important µHxpoUW¶sector of the Scottish economy. International students make a significant 
contribution both in terms of their tuition fees and costs-of-living expenditure to the Scottish economy (see 
Bell et al., 2013).  It is all too forgotten that most students return to their country of origin on graduation so 
their migration is ³Wemporary´ However, there does seem to be demand amongst international students to 
stay in Scotland after graduation to gain practical work experience in an English-speaking environment. 
This was permitted by the ³Fresh Talent Initiative´ introduced by the then Scottish Executive and First 
Minister Jack McConnell in 2004 and the system was later adopted by the UK as a whole.  This has now 
been abolished across the UK by recent UK immigration policy reforms. However, lumping students in with 
the other classes of immigrants (as is current practice) seems inappropriate since they are very different in 
nature to other classes of immigrants. 
 
The fifth class of immigrants is immigrants who do not fit into any of the other four classes. This is in a 
sense  a  residual  category,  which  can  simply  be  referred  to  as  Other  Immigrants.  It  would  include 
temporary workers who come to Scotland to work in a specific job for a specific time period (e.g. in 
agriculture or fish processing). It would also include foreign nationals who are employed by a foreign- 
owned company or multi-national. Such immigrants could be dealt with through a system of visas and work 
permits. 
 
In addition to the criteria that define each of these classes of immigrants, a Scottish immigration process 
should contain, for obvious reasons, some form of criminal background and medical health checks.  The 




expenses associated with both could be recouped in an application fee (as is common in most countries). 
Scotland would need to create an institution similar in function to the Home Office UK Border Agency to 
manage the system. Discussion now turns to how EU requirements would impact on the design and 
delivery of a Scottish immigration system were Scotland to become an EU member state. 
 
3. Immigration and EU Legislation 
 
There is no precedent for a ³region´within an EU member state forming a new country and therefore, there 
is no precedent of a ³Uegion´ within an EU member state forming a new country and becoming a new EU 
member state.  Much of law (and practice) is based on precedent, and as a consequence it is to be 
expected that many EU member states are watching very carefully what is happening in Scotland given 
their own domestic political circumstances. However, there are many historical examples of countries that 
have split up and formed new countries - sometimes a large set of new countries (eg the Soviet Union). 
There are also examples of countries that have split up into new countries and then joined the EU as 
member states (e.g. Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia). There are also former 
countries (e.g. Yugoslavia) that have split up into several countries, some of which have become EU 
member-states (e.g. Croatia) and others who have not (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia). 
 
In the event of a ³yes´ vote, the UK Government¶s view is that an independent Scotland would be 
considered a ³successor state´ (see HM Government, 2013).  This is consistent with international law and 
based largely on the fact that London would remain the capital of the rest-of-the-UK (RUK).   As a 
successor state, an independent Scotland would need to create a new set of international relationships 
while  already  established  UK  international  relationships  would  remain  with  what  remains  of  the  UK 
(RUK).  The President of European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso has made his position clear about 
what an independent Scotland would need to do: ³The UK would continue to exist as before, with only 
Scotland as a new state. Any new independent country would have to apply to join the E8´ The bottom- 
line is that an independent Scotland is not guaranteed ³automatic´(8membership. 
 
It is the author¶s view that Scotland¶s scope to negotiate with the EU would be negligible and the 
interpretation of Barroso¶s position is that Scotland would need to agree to and adopt fully current EU 
legislation as embodied in the Lisbon Treaty.  That is, were Scotland to wish to make a smooth transition 
from being a part of an ³old´ EU member state to being a ³new´ member state, at minimum, Scotland 
would have to adopt ALL the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, including those relating to immigration. The 
Lisbon Treaty is an agreement that represents the set of rules and requirements that both specify and 
determine EU membership. These rules are enforced by Directives and Regulations, which are the most 
important forms of binding EU Law issued by the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 
Put slightly differently, a country wishing to join the EU must agree to these requirements and once a 
member state it must follow these requirements as rules of law and hence practice. It is not possible to 
view such requirements as a list of ³Uecommended´ principles from which a country wishing EU 
membership can simply ³pick and choose´ 
 
Historically, some EU member states have been able to ³opt-ouW´ IUom EU legislation. Likewise some EU 
member states have been allowed to ³opt-in´ to only certain aspects of EU legislation. This effectively 
means that such member states do not have to follow polices agreed by the other EU member states. It 
should therefore not be surprising that opt-outs are in fact rare: Denmark and the UK have four op-outs 
each; Ireland has two opt-outs; and Sweden has one ³de facto´ op-out (relating to the use of the euro 
currency as it did not participate in the so-called ³(5M,,´ currency arrangement, which fixes the exchange 
rate between the domestic currency and Euro for two years prior to adoption, so ³Wechnically´ Sweden did 
not meet a key requirement). Since 2004, thirteen countries have joined the EU, almost doubling its total 
membership. In the same period, of these 13 countries, only one has been allowed one opt-out: Poland. 
(The Czech Republic had reached agreement with the European Commission about a future op-out, 
however, this was recently voted down by the European Parliament). 
 
In order to better understand what the EU would require of Scotland to follow with respect to immigration 
attention turns to three specific areas of the Lisbon Treaty as  included primarily in: 
 
ɀ Articles 26, 77, 78 and 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; 
 
ɀ Title V: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Chapter II: Policies on Border Checks, Asylum 
and Immigration. 
 
More specifications are provided for by the Protocols Additional to the Treaty: 
 
ɀ Protocol No. 19 on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union. 
This is the former Protocol No. 2 integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the 
European Union; 





ɀ Protocol No. 20 on the application of certain aspects of Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to the United Kingdom and to Ireland; 
 
ɀ Protocol No. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. 
 
Table 1 presents a summary what the author believes are the main EU regulations relating to immigration. 




































With respect to the five immigrant classes discussed above, there is little in EU law that restricts the way 
³economic immigrants´ are selected. For example, the author can find nothing that, for example, is contrary 
to the UK¶s current points-based system. There is a Directive relating to international students that refers 
mainly to conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, 
unremunerated  training  or  voluntary  service.  However,  these  requirements  are  not  inconsistent  with 
current UK and Scotland practice since the Bologna Accords have been adopted. These two immigrant 
classes will most certainly be important economically and culturally in an independent Scotland and EU 
legislation will not impose on how such individuals are selected (see Coldwell, Lisenkova and Wright, 
2011). There appears to be no EU requirements concerning family reunification immigrants. Finally, EU 
member states have the right to have a national system of visa, residence permits and work permits as 
long as such holders do not have the right to reside (and hence work) in other EU member states. 
However, a clause in Article 77 states that the EU should pursue a ³... policy on visas and other short-stay 
residence permits´ There is considerable legislation surrounding Refugees and Asylum-seekers and in the 
longer-term their aim is to move forward in a step-by-step manner to create a European Asylum System, 
something much in the news given recent tragic events in Lampedusa, Italy.  The UK has opted-out of 
several  of  these  requirements  while  opting-in  to  others.  As  mentioned  above,  EU  requirements  for 
refugees and asylum-seekers would not likely impinge much on Scotland, mainly because the expected 
numbers would be very small. Much of this legislation is concerned with establishing the minimum 
standards in the ways in which those seeking asylum should be treated. These requirements are very 
specific and detailed. It is the author¶s view, however, that current UK practice is above these minimum 
standards. 




An independent Scotland would be expected to join the Blue Card. This is a system to attract highly- 
qualified immigrants by supporting member states and EU companies¶ efforts to fill gaps in their labour 
markets that cannot be filled by their own citizens, other EU citizens or legally-resident non-EU citizens. 
Once a member state grants a Blue Card to an immigrant, after two years that person can move to a job in 
another member state in an unrestricted manner (i.e. before obtaining EU citizenship).  It is clear that the 
Blue  Card  system  will  result  in  an  independent  Scotland  ceding  some  control  over  this  class  of 
immigration. However, it is the author¶s view that the flow of Blue Card immigrants to Scotland would be 
small, especially relative to the numbers of EU citizens moving from other member states to Scotland. In 
addition, Scotland would likely lose immigrants to other member states but not to what remains of the UK 
since the UK is not a member of the Blue Card system. It is unclear whether Scotland would be a net-loser 
or net-gainer in the two-way flow of Blue Card holders. 
 
4. The Schengen Agreement 
 
A controversial EU requirement relates to the so-called Schengen Agreement. The ³6chengen Agreement´
led to the establishment of thH³6chengen Area´ The Schengen Area is a group of countries where there 
are no internal borders between them. One outcome of this is that individuals are able to travel between 
countries without a passport and border controls. Individuals do have to carry some form of bona fide 
identification and are not exempt from border checks. Citizens from outside the Schengen Area need to 
apply for only one visa when visiting several countries in the Schengen Area, instead of applying for one 
for each of the countries they will visit. Non-EU countries can also apply to be a member of the Schengen 
Area.  Membership in the Schengen Area requires that border forces and police agencies across the 
Schengen Area be more integrated and work more closely together. 
 
The Schengen Agreement has been incorporated into the European Union¶s legal framework by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (1997), and is consequently part of the Lisbon Treaty. A Protocol attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam incorporates the developments brought about by the Schengen Agreement into the EU 
framework. The Schengen Area is now within the legal and institutional framework of the EU and is now, 
and has been for some time, a key feature of EU membership. 
 
There are 22 EU member-states that take full part in the Schengen Agreement: Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. There are 4 
non-EU countries that take full part in the Schengen Agreement: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland. There are 4 EU member-states are bounded to be part of the Schengen Agreement but not 
yet entitled to accede to the Agreement: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania. There are only 2 EU 
member-states who are not full members: the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. 
 
The cases of Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania are informative. These countries have agreed to join 
the Schengen Area but currently must follow border practices similar to those EU member-states that 
border on non-EU countries. This decision was made by the European Commission and not by the 
individual countries applying for membership, so it is ABSOLUTELY NOT an example of these countries 
somehoZ ³opting-out of Schengen´  The CommissioQ¶s decision was based on its assessment as to 
whether a country is ready at the time of entry to fulfil the practical obligations and requirements of the 
legislation and not by any means a ³choice´made by the country seeking entry. The main reason these 
countries failed to comply is that they have ³leaky borders´ with non-EU countries. More specifically: 
Bulgaria with Macedonia, Serbia with Turkey; Croatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia; Cyprus 
with Turkey (or more correctly the Turkish Cypriot-administered area); and Romania with Moldova and the 
Ukraine. 
 
In addition, the EU was concerned that the border forces in these countries were not developed enough to 
effectively carry out the required responsibilities due it said to: too few border guards and officials, 
inadequately trained border guards and officials; poor management practises and corruption. However, 
there has been heavy investment by these countries and the EU aimed at bringing these countries up to 
the required standard. Timetables  for each of these countries  have been set indicating when these 
member states will become full members of the Schengen Area. The current UK Government has stated 
categorically that it has no intention of joining the Schengen Area in the foreseeable future. 
 
The UK along with the Republic of Ireland forms the Common Travel Area (CTA). This agreement dates 
back to the creation of the Irish Free State (1923), when the UK Government was removed as Ireland¶s 
colonial  power.  In  practice,  it  works  in  a  similar  manner  as  Schengen  Area,  allowing  unrestricted 
movement of residents between mainland UK, Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Isle of Man and 
Channel Islands. 
 
The SNP Government has stated that it will opt-out of the Schengen Agreement, since its preference is to 
remain part of the CTA. It is difficult to think of a set of circumstances that would allow Scotland to opt-out 
and not be part of the Schengen Area as this is now the norm in the EU with only two outliers (i.e. the UK 




and Republic of Ireland). One view is that Scotland will be required by the EU to leave the CTA and join 
Schengen Area in order to be admitted as an EU member state. The UK is isolated in its opinion that 
membership of the Schengen Area is both problematic and undesirable. Evidence in support of this claim 
is simply that Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are members of Schengen but not members 
of the EU. In addition, there have been no opt-outs of Schengen since Ireland and the UK in 1997. It is 
now a given that new member states will (eventually) become members of the Schengen Area, although 
the length of time that this might take could be considerable. It is the author¶s view that the European 
Commission will stand firm on this matter. 
 
Even if one were to accept the view that joining the EU is a ³process of negotiation´ one must ask what 
would give Scotland a strong negotiating position.   Scotland represents about 1.5 per cent of the total EU 
population and it generates slightly less than 1.5 per cent of the total EU output (GDP). Furthermore, it is 
by no means guaranteed that even were agreement reached between Scotland and the European 
Commission (to opt-out or not of Schengen) it is a fact that  membership into the EU can still be vetoed by 
another EU member state. An independent Scotland may very well set a dangerous precedent for other 
member states that have regions with strong secessionist aspirations. Such member states may not be 
enthusiastic about Scotland becoming a new EU member. Though one may ask how likely this is, it is too 
often forgotten that France, under De Gaulle, vetoed the UK¶s application to join the then European 
Economic Community in 1963; so, nothing is guaranteed. 
 
Were an independent Scotland to decide to join the Schengen Area, then what remained of the UK (RUK) 
would continue to be part of the CTA along with Ireland. The UK has an opt-out and is not the succeeding 
state. As such, Scottish independence by definition would mean that what is currently aQ³internal bordeU´
between Scotland and England would become an ³international bordeU´ This scenario would result in an 
EU member state in the Schengen Area having a border with an EU member state not in the Schengen 
Area. Another current example of this is Slovenia and Croatia. The Schengen Border Code stipulates what 
is required when a Schengen country borders a non-Schengen country.  A strict interpretation of this Code 
is that there would need to be some form of ³hard bordeU´ between Scotland and England. The Code 
stipulates in considerable detail what is required based on geography (e.g. water or land border) and other 
factors. However, the usual minimum requirements are: the operation of checkpoints and border guards, 
the patrolling of the border, the use of documents (usually a passport) for border crossing and potentially 
the construction of a fence or some other physical barrier. 
 
A recent report by the UK Government (HM Government, 2013b) concluded that the transformation of the 
Scotland-England border from an internal to an international border would generate significant negative 
³border effects´ A border effect is the welfare loss caused when a border is built (or a current border in 
place is strengthened) as it reduces the trade in goods and services. There is very little disagreement 
amongst economists that border effects do exist in theory, however, there is no agreement on how 
important they are since the empirical evidence testing for their size and relative importance is very mixed. 
Even if one were to believe the UK Government¶s conclusion that ³negative´ border effects would make an 
independent Scotland a poorer place, it does not discuss - far less assess - any ³positive´border effects 
generated by Scotland being a member of the (much larger) Schengen Area. Joining the Schengen Area 
implies a ³weakening the borders between the current 26 EU member states and Scotland. The benefit to 
Scotland of being in the Schengen Area - and out of the CTA - is thus a trade-off for Scotland between 
making one border less transparent and twenty six other borders more transparent. 
 
One final point. There are reasons to believe that Ireland could very well benefit from leaving the CTA and 
joining the Schengen Area. Ireland is more ³pro-Europe´ than the UK: it is in the Eurozone and it is unclear 
whether Ireland is committed to the CTA ad infinitum. The author¶s view is that much of Ireland¶s 
commitment is historic and has little to do with current economic cost-benefits and rather more with the 
politics of being seen to keep the border between the Republic and Northern Ireland ³open at all costs´. 
Ireland certainly does not have security concerns, which seem to be the main reason the UK Government 
offers for opting out of the Schengen Area. However, an independent Scotland in the Schengen Area 
might cause Ireland to rethink its position. Were Ireland to join the Schengen Area then what remains of 
the UK (RUK) would be the only EU member state which has not adopted the Schengen Agreement. What 
would remain of the CTA would be what remains of the UK, including the Isle of Man and the Channel 
Islands. This would make the UK even more isolated with respect to EU practice. In the opinion of the 




This paper has examined how the SNP Government¶s ³double desire´ of independence and EU 
membership would impact on its ability to design and deliver an effective immigration policy. Its main 
conclusion is that the EU would not unduly restrict the ability of an independent Scotland to do so as most 
EU legislation is concerned with refugees and asylum seekers, which are not likely to be numerically 
important in an independent Scotland.  Likewise, EU legislation says little about how economic migrants 




and students  should be selected; two  groups  that will  be  extremely important both numerically and 
economically to an independent Scotland. 
 
There is broad consensus amongst political parties in Scotland that the current UK-wide immigration 
system (and recent UK-wide immigration policy) is not serving Scottish interests. It is the author¶s view that 
these interests would be better served were Scotland to be an EU member state. However, this opinion does 
NOT mean that these interests could not be served just as well (and perhaps even better) were Scotland to 
remain part of the UK.  The author is convinced that the UK immigration system could be adapted to better 
serve Scottish interests (see Mosca and Wright, 2009).  There is no need to go over old ground about how this 
might be achieved, suffice to say that it would require the Scottish and UK governments to work more closely 
on matters relating to immigration. In other words, independence is NOT the ONLY way for Scotland to 
deliver an effective immigration policy that meets its needs. 
 
The Schengen Agreement, however, complicates matters considerably with respect to immigration. 
Membership in the Schengen Area is a key feature of EU legislation and policy and hence there is an 
expectation that all new EU member states will (eventually) join. It seems unlikely that Scotland will be 
given an opt-out to stay in the CTA and not join the Schengen Area. The author¶s view is that Scotland would 
benefit from being a member of the Schengen Area, even if what remains of the UK stays in the CTA. The 
author finds it surprising that there has been no discussion to date of the benefits of an independent Scotland 
joining the Schengen Area.   The SNP Government has decided - even though it is not in its gift - that an 
independent Scotland will stay in the CTA.  As noted above, the ultimate decision about an independent 
ScotlanG¶s membership of the EU will be made by the European Union Parliament and not by the Parliaments 
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